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Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses

limited because it is ill equipped to handle the influx of crowdfunding
fraud.
The proposed exemption under H.R. 2930 is riddled with flaws
and it exposes the average American to unbearable risks without the
counterbalancing protections of the securities laws. H.R. 2930_ makes
it easier for issuers to target middle to lower class investors, yet it
fails to properly protect such individuals who need it the most. As
such the exemption makes it easier for financially unsophisticated
'
..
investors to gamble their life savings on highly speculative securities,
thereby undermining eighty years of securities doctrine. I realize our
economy desperately needs a boost, but an exemption for equity
crowdfunding is not the answer; rather, it is a political knee-jerk
reaction that will wreak havoc on the securities industry and the
economy as a whole. Congress still has time to reconsider its actions;
but if it goes forward with the exemption, get ready to watch the
fleecing of the American masses and the next securities blooper of the
21st century.

PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION
SHARED VIA SOCIAL NETWORKING:
THE GAP BETWEEN REALITY AND PROTECTION1

Madison M. Pool
ABSTRACT

Control over personal information has long been valued in
American society as a lynchpin of privacy. Traditional causes of
action evolved to protect this privacy in a world confined by the
bounds of physical space.
However, these approaches fail to
adequately remedy the harms confronted in the modern world of
cyberspace. When Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, it recognized the revolutionary
impact electronic medical records would have on individuals' control
over their personal health illformation (PHI) in the health care
context. This legislation not only laid the foundation for protection of
PHI through the HIP AA Privacy Rule, it also statutorily validated
this long-held American value of control over personal information in
the form of protections for PHI. Although the HIP AA Privacy Rule
established the first set of federal standards for protection of this
highly valued category of information, it remains limited to a narrow
group of covered entities.
Not only is PHI disclosed in social networking not protected by
current federal regulations, it is also largely unprotected by state law.
State law protections are still predominated by antiquated physicalspace based causes of action that ignore the realities of social
networking in a context unconstrained by geographic borders.
Combined, the shortcomings of federal legislative protections and the
outdated state protections result in a gap between the realities of
social networking and the available protections for PHI. Social
networking's ubiquity and the expectations of privacy held by users
and promoted by the sites themselves challenge the values of privacy
and protection for PHI.
When the HIP AA Privacy Rule was
established in 1996, Facebook did not exist. However, the legislation
was envisioned as a floor on which to build protections as technology
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and electronic storage of PHI evolved. Social networking is just such
an evolution.
This Note proposes the adoption of federal regulations to protect
PHI disclosed through online social networking. From rapidly and
unpredictably changing privacy settings, to sale of information to
advertisers, there · are many ways in which PHI is disclosed and
disseminated further than the user's known or intended audience. If
protection for PHI does not keep pace with the development of online
social networking, users will increasingly find themselves without
meaningful remedies to address emerging harms.

With social networking on the rise, 4 issues of informational privacy
are also increasing. 5
Yet despite social networking pitfalls, a
fascinating phenomenon has arisen-users are increasing activity. 6
Social networking is becoming more ingrained and incorporated into
everyday life: socially, politically, and even in the workplace. 7 Many
users, like Tom, continue to believe their information is far more
protected than it is. The reality of obtuse privacy policies, limited
user control, and widespread distribution of personal information to
third parties are obscured by the sites' promotions advertising privacy
control and "sharing but like real life. "8 These implications of

INTRODUCTION

Tom is a social networking user. 2 He restricted his privacy
settings so that only a small group of his "friends" could see his
postings. These postings included a discussion of his struggles with
diabetes. Without warning, the site changed its privacy settings and
Tom's postings-including his diabetes dialogue-became visible to
everyone who subscribes to the site and hundreds of millions of other
users, including his boss. Not only were his postings visible, but his
picture also began appearing on other users' pages next to
advertisements for diabetes medications.
In frustration, Tom
attempted to delete his profile and erase all this information from the
site. To his dismay, the site informed him that the information could
not be deleted. Suddenly, the privacy settings Tom had been so
vigilant in monitoring seemed like a sham.
While Tom is merely an illustrative example, the problems are
real and mirror the experiences of millions of social networking users. 3

2.

3.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10167143
(praising increased privacy
settings options but criticizing the disregard of personal data sales to
advertisers); see also Kevin Bankston, Facebook's New Privacy Changes:
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 9,
2009),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacychanges-good-bad-and-ugly (criticizing new Facebook privacy changes as
"clearly intended to push Facebook users to publicly share even more
information than before" and reducing user control over "personal
data.") (emphasis in original). However, there had been no resolution
until the recent settlement agreement with the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"). See Emil Protalinski, Facebook settles with FTC
over default privacy settings, ZDNET (Nov. 29, 2011, 10:09 AM),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-settles-with-ftc-overdefault-privacy-settings/5667( discussing the settlement terms).

4.

For example, Twitter reported an average of 460,000 new accounts
created per day from mid-February, 2011, to mid-March, 2011 and a
1823 increase in the number of mobile users from March 2010 to March
2011. @Twitter, #numbers, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011, 11:38 AM)
http://blog.twitter.com/2011/03/numbers.html.

5.

See, e.g., Maria Aspan, How Sticky Is Membership on Facebook? Just
Try Breaking Free, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2008),
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/technology /
llfacebook.html?pagewanted=all
(discussing
difficulties
with
permanently deleting information from Facebook); see also Alex Pell,
Hey, Facebook, Just Let Go of Me, SUNDAY TIMES (Mar. 16, 2008),
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/
article3553216.ece (discussing lack of control of personal information
resulting from the option to "deactivate," but not permanently delete, a
Facebook profile).

This example is fictional and the name invented; any resemblance to a
real person or story is coincidental. For a real life example, see Julia
Angwin & Steve Stecklow, "Scrapers' Dig Deep for Data on the Web,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2010 9:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703358504575544381288117888.html ("'I felt
totally violated,' says Bilal Ahmed . . . who used PatientsLikeMe to
connect with other people suffering from depression. He used a
pseudonym on the message boards, but his PatientsLikeMe profile
linked to his blog, which contains his real name.").

Facebook has more than one billion monthly active users, with 618
million active daily users as of December, 2012. Key Facts, FACEBOOK
(Dec. 31, 2012), http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts. As of September
8, 2011, Twitter reached 100 million active users. @Twitter, One
Hundred Million Voices, TWITTER BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 9:32 AM),
http://blog.twitter.com/2011/09/one-hundred-million-voices.html.
[hereinafter @Twitter Voices]. Discontent with such practices has been
discussed for several years. See, e.g., Facebook Reveals 'Simplified'
Privacy Changes, BBC (May 26, 2010),

412

6.

See, e.g., Tweet, tweet! Using Twitter to Build Career Connections
Now, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 2011, at 8; Joe Dysart, Viral Information:
Interactive press releases really spread the word, ABA J, Oct. 2011, at
32; @Twitter Voices, supra note 3.

7.

See, e.g., @Twitter Voices, supra note 3; Tweet, tweet! Using Twitter to
Build Career Connections Now, supra note 6, at 8; Dysart, supra note
6, at 32.

8.

Google, Google+: Sharing but like real life, YouTUBE (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GRmDGvdkg8E ("Sharing but like
real life." quote appears at time code 1:21).
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an evolution.
This Note proposes the adoption of federal regulations to protect
PHI disclosed through online social networking. From rapidly and
unpredictably changing privacy settings, to sale of information to
advertisers, there· are many ways in which PHI is disclosed and
disseminated further than the user's known or intended audience. If
protection for PHI does not keep pace with the development of online
social networking, users will increasingly find themselves without
meaningful remedies to address emerging harms.

With social networking on the rise, 4 issues of informational privacy
are also increasing. 5
Yet despite social networking pitfalls, a
fascinating phenomenon has arisen-users are increasing activity. 6
Social networking is becoming more ingrained and incorporated into
everyday life: socially, politically, and even in the workplace. 7 Many
users, like Tom, continue to believe their information is far more
protected than it is. The reality of obtuse privacy policies, limited
user control, and widespread distribution of personal information to
third parties are obscured by the sites' promotions advertising privacy
control and "sharing but like real life. "8 These implications of
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everyone who subscribes to the site and hundreds of millions of other
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site. To his dismay, the site informed him that the information could
not be deleted. Suddenly, the privacy settings Tom had been so
vigilant in monitoring seemed like a sham.
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privacy, which mask the sites' actual practices, undermine users'
legitimate privacy expectations. 9 Disturbingly, current law does not
adequately protect social networking users. 10
One area in which this lack of protection is particularly worrisome
is personal health information, which Americans attach great
Americans value protecting privacy
importance to protecting. 11
through control of personal information generally, 12 but PHI has
received extra attention over the past two decades. 13 Control over
personal information is particularly pertinent to PHI because of its
uniquely high potential for misuse, embarrassment, pain, . and
discrimination. 14 However, protection for PHI is largely lacking in
social networking. With the continued increase in social networking
and the lack of protection under current law, a gap has resulted
between social networking realities and PHI protections.
Current protection for PHI falls into two categories: federal
regulatory protection and state protection. 15 Both of these categories
fall short of preseiying the control over PHI that American society
expects. 16 First, current federal regulations are 11.mited only to
"covered entities" 17 and do not apply to social networking. Second,

state protections fail for two reasons: the differing protection among
states does not align with the reality that social networking is largely
unrestricted by state and even national borders, 18 and traditional
causes of action apply imperfectly, if at all, to privacy needs in an
online social networking setting. 19
These causes of action are
characterized by a focus on physical space and retrospective rather
than preventative measures, neither of which comport with the
realities of harms in online social networking. 20
This Note addresses the novel issue of protection for PHI in social
networking21 and proposes the adoption of federal regulations to keep
pace with online social networking's rapid evolution and provide
protection for PHI disclosed in this setting. Part I of this Note
highlights the value Americans place on preserving informational
privacy by controlling personal information. Privacy is a value
strongly embedded both in American legal history22 and in American
cultural understanding, 23 and PHI is one area in which value of

9.

See infra Part III.A.

10.

See infra Part IL

11.

Health and Human Serv. ("HHS") Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,464 (Dec. 28,
2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164) [hereinafter "2000 Privacy
Standards]" ("Among different sorts of personal information, health
information is among the most sensitive.").

12.

Id. ("A right to privacy in personal information has historically found
expression in American law.").

13.

Id. ("Among different sorts of personal information, health information
is among the most sensitive."). While much has been written about
privacy issues with the advent of electronic medical records, other
potential disclosures of personal health information have yet to be
addressed. For example, both Nick Terry (Hall Render Professor of
Law and Co-director of the William S. and Christine S. Hall Center for
Law and Health at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of
Law) and Sharona Hoffman (Professor of Law and Bioethics and CoDirector of the Law-Medicine Center at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law) have written prolifically on this issue. See
infra notes 24 and 101.

14.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most
sensitive.").

15.

See infra Part IL

16.

See infra Part IL

17.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,476-77 (defining covered
entities as "health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care
providers").
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18.

See, e.g., Proto v. Hamic, No. FSTCV106005537S, 2011 WL 1992202
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 10, 2011) (Connecticut resident brought claim
against former student now residing in Texas; court found jurisdiction
under Connecticut long-arm statute). In addition, Facebook reports that
"approximately 803 of [its] monthly active users are outside the United
States and Canada." Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK (Feb. 19, 2012),
http:/ /newsroom.fb.com/ content/ default.aspx?NewsAreaid=22.

19.

See, e.g., Patricia Sanchez Abril, A My(Space) of One's Own: On
Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73
(2007-08); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CAL. L.
REV. 2007 (2010); Spencer D. Kiggins, Privacy in Health Information
Technology in the Age of Electronic Informational Piracy, 10
TELEHEALTH L.J. 33 (2009).

20.

Cf. Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S. 650, 655, n.6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (citing Cordero v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 866 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct.
NY Co. 2008) (finding no common law right of privacy in New York))
and Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 803 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(finding use of plaintiff's profile pictures and names sufficient to state a
claim under "long recognized a right to protect one's name and likeness
against appropriation by others").

21.

For example, MCGRADY ON SOCIAL MEDIA makes only one mention of
HIP AA ("legislated' privacy rights are derived from several federal and
state laws . . . including . . . HIPAA"). PAUL D. MCGRADY, JR.,
MCGRADY ON SOCIAL MEDIA§ 5.03 (also making no mention of personal
health information).

22.

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); 2000
Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,464 (There are "enduring values
in American law that relate to privacy," including a common law or
statutory right to privacy recognized in every state, and "[m]any of the
most basic protections in the Constitution.").

23.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,464.
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most basic protections in the Constitution.").

23.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,464.

415

4 ·No. 2 · 2013
Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET ·VOL.

control over personal information is particularly evident. 24 The belief
that PHI should be afforded privacy protection has been statutorily
validated by the enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 and the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act. 25 This Part will discuss the
values that underlie the passage of these two Acts to show the
importance American society places on protecting PHI.
Part II explores the shortcomings of current privacy protections
for PHI shared via social networking. It will discuss the protections
offered by current regulations and show how this protection is limited
only to narrow categories of actors in the health care field, falling
short of the necessary protection for PHI. in social networking. This
Part will also show that state protections are insufficient for two
reasons. First, this Part will demonstrate how having differing causes
of action across states does not align with the reality that social
networking is largely unrestricted by state and even national borders.
Second, it will discuss the failings of the available causes of actionspecifically, their antiquated bases in physical space and failure to
provide meaningful remedies through adherence to retroactive privacy
protections.
Part III of this Note discusses the modern trend of social
networking and suggests that this is a viable area in which to extend
protections. This Part will show the value of protecting PHI disclosed
in social networking settings by addressing four realities of social
networking: (1) social networking is on the rise; (2) social networking
is valuable; (3) users expect that they will have control over their
information; and (4) this expectation of privacy is undermined by the
sites' conflicting privacy representations. This Part will further show
the value of extending protections into this area by highlighting
harms that will result to social networking users if the disconnect
between expected and actual protections remain unaddressed. These
harms include an inability to delete personal information after it is
posted, disclosure beyond the intended audience through unexpected
24.

25.

See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman & James C. Cooper, There is a Time to
Keep Silent and a Time to Speak, the Hard Part is Knowing Which is
Which: Striking the Balance Between Privacy Protection and the Flow
of Health Care Information, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279,
284 (2009-10); see also Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In
Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 335-36 (2007).
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and non-optional privacy changes, and the sale of personal
information to third party sites.
Part IV will advance a proposal for federal regulations to remedy
the shortcomings of the current law. The proposed regulations would
address the gap in the law in three ways. First, the regulations would
require meaningful privacy disclosures and truthful advertising by the
social networking sites.
Second, the regulations would establish
guidelines for PHI use and distribution by social networking sites and
third-party affiliates; Third, the regulations would provide meaningful
causes of action and remedies for users and sites alike. This Part will
also discuss the advantages of such a federal regulatory scheme,
including filling the current gap in the law, providing meaningful
dispute resolution options and remedies, and setting clear
expectations for all parties involved.
Finally, Part V further outlines the beneficial ramifications of
such a solution. 26 With the rapid advancements in social networking,
data management, and patient-managed electronic medical records,
such regulations could serve as a benchmark for mitigating other
harms before they arise.

I. CONTROL OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION: A MODERN
RECOGNITION OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN PRIVACY VALUES

Privacy is a value strongly embedded both in American legal
history27 and in American cultural understanding; "it speaks to . . .
individual and collective freedom. "28 From informational privacy to
physical privacy, "the rights of the individual" have been at the
"forefront of [American] democracy. "29 One way these rights are
respected is through a privacy-based theory of control. 30 Privacy
through control can apply both to controlling one's physical space and
to controlling access to one's personal information. 31 The right to

26.

While this Note focuses on PHI disclosed in a social networking setting,
the proposed regulatory scheme could be adapted to fit other categories
of information and other data-mining settings.

27.

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

28.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464.

29.

Id.

30.

See, e.g., Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of
Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001 (2008-09); Patricia
Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (2010); Patricia
Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007-08).

31.

See Levin & Abril, supra note 30, at 1007-08 (discussing ways of
thinking about the concept of "privacy"). This Note focuses on

See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA; HIPAA
Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 & 164 (2010) [hereinafter HIPAA
Privacy Rule]; and Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title XIII, Div. A & Title IV,
Div. B (2009) [hereinafter HITECH] (part of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009).
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control over personal information is particularly evident. 24 The belief
that PHI should be afforded privacy protection has been statutorily
validated by the enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 and the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act. 25 This Part will discuss the
values that underlie the passage of these two Acts to show the
importance American society places on protecting PHI.
Part II explores the shortcomings of current privacy protections
for PHI shared via social networking. It will discuss the protections
offered by current regulations and show how this protection is limited
only to narrow categories of actors in the health care field, falling
short of the necessary protection for PHI. in social networking. This
Part will also show that state protections are insufficient for two
reasons. First, this Part will demonstrate how having differing causes
of action across states does not align with the reality that social
networking is largely unrestricted by state and even national borders.
Second, it will discuss the failings of the available causes of actionspecifically, their antiquated bases in physical space and failure to
provide meaningful remedies through adherence to retroactive privacy
protections.
Part III of this Note discusses the modern trend of social
networking and suggests that this is a viable area in which to extend
protections. This Part will show the value of protecting PHI disclosed
in social networking settings by addressing four realities of social
networking: (1) social networking is on the rise; (2) social networking
is valuable; (3) users expect that they will have control over their
information; and (4) this expectation of privacy is undermined by the
sites' conflicting privacy representations. This Part will further show
the value of extending protections into this area by highlighting
harms that will result to social networking users if the disconnect
between expected and actual protections remain unaddressed. These
harms include an inability to delete personal information after it is
posted, disclosure beyond the intended audience through unexpected
24.

25.

See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman & James C. Cooper, There is a Time to
Keep Silent and a Time to Speak, the Hard Part is Knowing Which is
Which: Striking the Balance Between Privacy Protection and the Flow
of Health Care Information, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279,
284 (2009-10); see also Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In
Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 335-36 (2007).
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and non-optional privacy changes, and the sale of personal
information to third party sites.
Part IV will advance a proposal for federal regulations to remedy
the shortcomings of the current law. The proposed regulations would
address the gap in the law in three ways. First, the regulations would
require meaningful privacy disclosures and truthful advertising by the
social networking sites.
Second, the regulations would establish
guidelines for PHI use and distribution by social networking sites and
third-party affiliates; Third, the regulations would provide meaningful
causes of action and remedies for users and sites alike. This Part will
also discuss the advantages of such a federal regulatory scheme,
including filling the current gap in the law, providing meaningful
dispute resolution options and remedies, and setting clear
expectations for all parties involved.
Finally, Part V further outlines the beneficial ramifications of
such a solution. 26 With the rapid advancements in social networking,
data management, and patient-managed electronic medical records,
such regulations could serve as a benchmark for mitigating other
harms before they arise.
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respected is through a privacy-based theory of control. 30 Privacy
through control can apply both to controlling one's physical space and
to controlling access to one's personal information. 31 The right to

26.
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thinking about the concept of "privacy"). This Note focuses on

See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA; HIPAA
Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 & 164 (2010) [hereinafter HIPAA
Privacy Rule]; and Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title XIII, Div. A & Title IV,
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privacy through control of personal information "has historically
found expression in American law. "32 This tradition continued with
the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIP AA). 33
As a nation, the United States places high value on protecting
PHI.34 PHI includes "information ... that ... relates to the past,
present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
individual. "35 This information is extremely personal and intimate,
and its disclosure has a uniquely high potential for misuse,
embarrassment, pain, and discrimination. 36 Statutes passed over the
last two decades have provided PHI with privacy protection. 37
Congress passed HIP AA in part to establish "standards with respect
to the privacy of individually identifiable health information. "38
In passing HIPAA, "Congress recognized the importance of
protecting the privacy of health information given the rapid evolution
of health information systems." 39 Pursuant to this goal, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) promulgated final
rules and regulations to establish such standards. 40 Published on
August 14, 2002, the regulations are now known as the HIP AA

informational privacy exercised via control over access to one's personal
information.
32.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464.

33.

HIP AA, supra note 25.

34.

See supra notes 23 and 24.

35.

HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at § 160.103.

36.

See 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most
sensitive.").

37.

See generally HIP AA, supra note 25A; HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note
25; and HITECH, supra note 25.

38.

HIPAA, supra note 25, at § 264(a-b) ("The recommendations under
subsection (a) shall address at least the following: (1) The rights that an
individual who is a subject of individually identifiable health
information should have. (2) The procedures that should be established
for the exercise of such rights. (3) The uses and disclosures of such
information that should be authorized or required."). Individually
identifiable health information is health information "[t]hat identifies the
individual; or ... [w]ith respect to which there is a reasonable basis to
believe the information can be used to identify the individual." HIP AA
Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at § 160.103.

39.

HHS Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
pts. 160 & 164) [hereinafter Privacy Standards Modifications].

40.

Id. at§ 264(c); HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25.
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Privacy Rule41 and "create[d], for the first time, a floor of national
protections for the privacy of [individuals'] most sensitive
information-health information. "42
One of the HIPAA Privacy Rule's foremost purposes is "[t]o
protect and enhance the rights of consumers by providing them access
to their health information and controlling the inappropriate use of
that information. "43 HHS recognized the area had a pressing need for ·
informational protection when it promulgated the regulations. 44 The
HIP AA Privacy Rule sets out comprehensive requirements regarding
the use and disclosure of protected health information. 45 To reiterate
that the HIP AA Privacy Rule is a minimum standard, HHS added
that it "creates a framework of protection that can be strengthened
by both the federal government and by states as health information
systems continue to evolve. "46
In explaining the need for .the HIP AA Privacy Rule, HHS noted
that "few experiences are as fundamental to liberty and autonomy as
maintaining control over when, how, to whom, and where you disclose
personal material. "47
The HIP AA Privacy Rule is a landmark
regulation that created the first set of federal standards for protection
of PHI, 48 and it recognizes the importance of protecting this category
of information. 49
41.

HHS issued the Privacy Rule to implement requirements of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. See U.S. Dept. of
HHSS, Office for Civil Rights, Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 1
(2003), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy /hipaa/understanding/
summary/privacysummary.pdf.. [hereinafter PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY]
(A slight misnomer: the HIPAA "Privacy" Rule provides standards for
"individuals' privacy rights to understand and control how their health
information is used" that in operation preserve the right of
informational control and confidentiality rather than strict privacy.).

42.

Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 38.

43.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463.

44.

2000 Privacy· Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462 ("These protections
will begin to address growing public concerns that advances in electronic
technology .and evolution in the health care industry are resulting, or
may result, in a substantial erosion of the privacy surrounding
individually identifiable health information .... ").

45.

Id.

46.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.; see also PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 41 at 1.

49.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,463 ("In enacting HIP AA,
Congress recognized the fact that administrative simplification cannot
succeed if we do not also protect the privacy and confidentiality of
personal health information."); see also, PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra
note 41, at 1 (balancing an assurance of proper protection for
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Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) promulgated final
rules and regulations to establish such standards. 40 Published on
August 14, 2002, the regulations are now known as the HIPAA

informational privacy exercised via control over access to one's personal
information.
32.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11~ at 82,464.

33.

HIP AA, supra note 25.

34.

See supra notes 23 and 24.

35.

HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at§ 160.103.

36.

See 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most
sensitive.").

37.

See generally HIP AA, supra note 25A; HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note
25; and HITECH, supra note 25.

38.

HIPAA, supra note 25, at § 264(a-b) ("The recommendations under
subsection (a) shall address at least the following: (1) The rights that an
individual who is a subject of individually identifiable health
information should have. (2) The procedures that should be established
for the exercise of such rights. (3) The uses and disclosures of such
information that should be authorized or required."). Individually
identifiable health information is health information "[t]hat identifies the
individual; or ... [w]ith respect to which there is a reasonable basis to
believe the information can be used to identify the individual." HIP AA
Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at§ 160.103.
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Privacy Rule41 and "create[d], for the first time, a floor of national
protections for the privacy of [individuals'] most sensitive
information-health information. "42
One of the HIP AA Privacy Rule's foremost purposes is "[t]o
protect and enhance the rights of consumers by providing them access
to their health information and controlling the inappropriate use of
that information. "43 HHS recognized the area had a pressing need for ·
informational protection when it promulgated the regulations. 44 The
HIP AA Privacy Rule sets out comprehensive requirements regarding
the use and disclosure of protected health information. 45 To reiterate
that the HIP AA Privacy Rule is a minimum standard, HHS added
that it "creates a framework of protection that can be strengthened
by both the federal government and by states as health information
systems continue to evolve. "46
In explaining the need for .the HIP AA Privacy Rule, HHS noted
that "few experiences are as fundamental to liberty and autonomy as
maintaining control over when, how, to whom, and where you disclose
personal material. "47
The HIP AA Privacy Rule is a landmark
regulation that created the first set of federal standards for protection
of PHI, 48 and it recognizes the importance of protecting this category
of information. 49
41.

HHS issued the Privacy Rule to implement requirements of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. See U.S. Dept. of
HHSS, Office for Civil Rights, Summary of the HIP AA Privacy Rule, 1
(2003), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy /hipaa/understanding/
summary/privacysummary.pdf.. [hereinafter PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY]
(A slight misnomer: the HIPAA "Privacy" Rule provides standards for
"individuals' privacy rights to understand and control how their health
information is used" that in operation preserve the right of
informational control and confidentiality rather than strict privacy.).

42.

Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 38.

43.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463.

44.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462 ("These protections
will begin to address growing public concerns that advances in electronic
technology .and evolution in the health care industry are resulting, or
may result, in a substantial erosion of the privacy surrounding
individually identifiable health information .... ").

45.
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46.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.; see also PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 41 at 1.

49.
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Congress recognized the fact that administrative simplification cannot
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The HIP AA Privacy Rule's framework was expanded with the
passage of the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, providing more protection for health
information maintained electronically. 50 Individuals now have the
statutory right to know who has accessed their health information, a
response to the pitfalls of electronically maintaining medical records. 51
The requirement illustrates the value placed on privacy protection for
electronic, sensitive information, 52 as HHS recognized a fundamental
right to privacy embodied in PHI. 53
However, despite PHI's sensitive nature, the current regulatory
protections are limited. They do not extend beyond a few narrow
classes of "covered entities," 54 and do not address the social
networking issues. Additionally, state laws do not offer adequate
protection for PHI shared in social networking interactions, with
provisions that "vary significantly from state to state" often failing to
provide basic protections. 55 These shortcomings were the reason for
developing federal regulations to safeguard PHI in the first place. 56
As noted by HHS, "Privacy is a fundamental right. As such, it must
be viewed differently than any ordinary economic good. "57 . The
privileges and stringent privacy requirements established under these
regulations are in place even though covered entities and their
business associates are providing valuable services to individuals. 58

These requirements highlight the collective belief that individuals'
PHI deserves strong protection. 59

individuals' health information while permitting "important uses" of
that information is a "major goal" of the Privacy Rule).
50.

II. CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL HEALTH
INFORMATION ARE INSUFFICIENT

Despite the sensitivity of PHI and the belief that it should be
protected, 60 current protections are limited. 61 Both the current federal
regulatory protections and state protections fall short of providing
adequate control over this valuable information. 62 Combined with
social networking's rapid evolution, a significant gap has resulted
between users' expected and actual control over PHI shared online. 63
A.

Federal Regulations: The HIPAA Privacy Rule and the HITECH
Act

The first category of protection for PHI is federal: HIP AA and the
HITECH Act. 64
Despite the high value American society places on protecting the
privacy of PHI, these protections are limited. As currently written,
these standards only apply to certain "covered entities" 65 and their
"business associates. "66 "Covered entities" are limited to health plans,
health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers. 67 The
HIP AA Privacy Rule also applies these privacy requirements to the
"business associates" 68 of covered entities. 69 However, they do not

HITECH Act, 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C.
300jj-11) ("National Coordinator shall perform the duties under
subsection (c) in a manner consistent with the development of a
nationwide health information technology infrastructure that allows for
the electronic use and exchange of information").

60.

See supra Part I.

61.

See supra Part I.

62.

See supra Part I.

51.

123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5, §13405(c)(l)(B) (codified as amended 42
U.S.C. 17935) ("[A]n individual shall have a right to receive an
accounting of disclosures ... ").

63.

52.

Id.

53.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464. ("Privacy is a
fundamental right.").

See Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 (noting
consumer's concerns about the privacy of their personal information).
See also 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462 (discussing
how advances in technology affect individually identifiable health
information).

64.

See supra Part I.

54.

Id. at 82,476-77 (These covered entities are "health plans, health care

65.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,476-77 (These covered
entities are "health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health
care providers .... ").

59.

clearinghouses, and certain health care providers .... ").

See generally supra note 66 & 67.

55.

Id. at 82,463-64 (including access to a user's own medical records).

56.

Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182. ("[H]ealth
privacy protections are intended to provide consumers with similar
assurances that their health information, including genetic. information,
will be properly protected.").

66.

HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at§ 164.502(e) (allowing a covered
entity to disclose PHI to a business associate contingent upon
"satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately
safeguard the information").

57.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,464.

67.

Id. at § 160.103.

58.

See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 19; Kiggins, supra note 19; and
Gilman & Cooper, supra note 24.

68.

Id. (defining business associate as "a person who: (i) On behalf of such
covered entity . . . other than in the capacity of a member of the
workforce of such covered entity . . . performs, or assists in the
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The HIPAA Privacy Rule's framework was expanded with the
passage of the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, providing more protection for health
information maintained electronically. 50 Individuals now have the
statutory right to know who has accessed their health information, a
response to the pitfalls of electronically maintaining medical records. 51
The requirement illustrates the value placed on privacy protection for
electronic, sensitive information, 52 as HHS recognized a fundamental
right to privacy embodied in PHI. 53
However, despite PHI's sensitive nature, the current regulatory
protections are limited. They do not extend beyond a few narrow
classes of "covered entities, "54 and do not address the social
networking issues. Additionally, state laws do not offer adequate
protection for PHI shared in social networking interactions, with
provisions that "vary significantly from state to state" often failing to
provide basic protections. 55 These shortcomings were the reason for
developing federal regulations to safeguard PHI in the first place. 56
As noted by HHS, "Privacy is a fundamental right. As such, it must
be viewed differently than any ordinary economic good. "57 . The
privileges and stringent privacy requirements established under these
regulations are in place even though covered entities and their
business associates are providing valuable services to individuals. 58

These requirements highlight the collective belief that individuals'
PHI deserves strong protection. 59
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A.
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health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers. 67 The
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provide protection outside of these narrow categories, thus failing to
adequately protect PHI from disclosure in other settings. 70
While the HIP AA Privacy Rule and the HITECH Act- are steps in
the right direction of establishing federal standards for privacy
protection of PHI, they fall short of protecting PHI and privacy in the
social networking setting. When HHS promulgated the HIP AA
Privacy Rule, it noted consumers' increasing concerns "about the
privacy of their personal information, "71 specifically as "advances in
electronic technology ... are resulting, or may result, in a substantial
erosion of the privacy surrounding individually identifiable health
information. . . . "72 HHS envisioned the HIP AA Privacy Rule as a
floor that could be built upon as new technologies developed and
offered challenges to protecting PHI. 73 Building on this floor with
new federal regulations to protect PHI disclosed in social networking
is a natural progression in addressing the increasing role played by
social networking in our society. 74
B.

State Protections: Traditional Causes of Action

Because there are no federal regulations that directly protect PHI
outside of the narrow parameters described, 75 most allegations of
inappropriate use or disclosure of PHI in a social networking context
are addressed by state law. 76 Protection for PHI varies across the
performance of: (A) A function or activity involving the use or
disclosure of individually identifiable health information, including
claims processing or administration .... ").
69.

Id. Generally, authorizations are required before protected health
information may be disclosed by covered entities. See id. at §§
164.502(a), 164.508(a).

70.

See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 24 (discussing inadequate
government response to protecting PHI).

71.

Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 (noting that
the Privacy Rule creates a basic level of national protections to address
public concern over privacy of their personal information).

72.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462.

73.

Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 ("[T]he
Privacy Rule creates, for the first time, a floor of national protections
for the privacy of [consumers'] most sensitive information-health
information.").

74.

See Levin & Abril, supra note 30, at 1004 (discussing the reasonableness
of the ge11.eral public's expectation of privacy over their personal online
information and their use of social networking sites to disclose personal
information).
·

75.

See supra Part II.A.

76.

See generally Abril, supra note 19, at 78 (discussing state tort law as
recourse for those wronged from disclosure of personal information via
social networking); see also Nicholas P. Terry, Physicians and Patients
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states and typically neither fully covers issues that arise in health care
systems nor reaches other potential abuses of PHI. 77 Traditional
common law causes of action are the most prevalent way plaintiffs
petition courts for redress, and these causes of action have developed
on a state-by-state basis. 78 However, this paradigm neglects important
realities for addressing harms that occur in online social networking.
These traditional causes of action fail to provide protection for
PHI disclosed in social networking in two ways. First, traditional
causes of action vary by state largely ignoring the reality that social
networking is largely unrestricted by state and even national
borders. 79 Second, traditional causes of action apply imperfectly, if at
all, to privacy needs in an online social networking setting because of:
(1) outdated restrictions based on control of physical space, and (2)
sole retrospective addressing of harms. 80
1.

Differing Protections Across the States: Adherence to State Borders

The lack of federal guidelines for privacy protection has resulted
in a fragmented system across the states. 81
In discussing the
importance of privacy for PHI, HHS noted that "[r]ules requiring the
protection of health privacy ... have been enacted primarily by the
states . . . [and] vary significantly from state to state and typically
apply to only part of the health care system. "82 HHS also noted that
many of these state laws "fail to provide such basic protections as
ensuring a patient's legal right to see a copy of his medical record. "83
Congress determined that privacy protection for PHI was sufficiently
important to enact the first set of federal privacy protections for
PHI. 84 Fragmented protection for health records was not acceptable;
Who "Friend" or "Tweet": Constructing a Legal Framework for Social
Networking in a Highly Regulated Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285 (2010).
77.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463 (noting wide variation
in state law protection for health information).

78.

See Abril, supra note 19, at 78; see also Terry, supra note 76.

79.

See, e.g., Proto, supra note 18; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 18.

80.

See sources cited supra note 19.

81.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463; see also Strahilevitz,
supra note 19 (discussing the need for a re-examination and reunification of privacy law generally to better accomplish the purpose of
privacy torts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 153
(1971) (noting that privacy rights are usually. determined by law of the
state where the plaintiff \\fas domiciled if the matter complained of was
published in that state).

82.

2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463.

83.

Id. at 82,464.

84.

Id. at 82,463 (outlining the purposes underlying congressional enactment
of the 2000 Privacy Standards).
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provide protection outside of these narrow categories, thus failing to
adequately protect PHI from disclosure in other settings. 70
While the HIP AA Privacy Rule and the HITECH Act· are steps in
the right direction of establishing federal standards for privacy
protection of PHI, they fall short of protecting PHI and privacy in the
social networking setting. When HHS promulgated the HIP AA
Privacy Rule, it noted consumers' increasing concerns "about the
privacy of their personal information, "71 specifically as "advances in
electronic technology ... are resulting, or may result, in a substantial
erosion of the privacy surrounding individually identifiable health
information. . . ."72 HHS envisioned the HIP AA Privacy Rule as a
floor that could be built upon as new technologies developed and
offered challenges to protecting PHI. 73 Building on this floor with
new federal regulations to protect PHI disclosed in social networking
is a natural progression in addressing the increasing role played by
social networking in our society. 74
B.

State Protections: Traditional Causes of Action

Because there are no federal regulations that directly protect PHI
outside of the narrow parameters described, 75 most allegations of
inappropriate use or disclosure of PHI in a social networking context
are addressed by state law. 76 Protection for PHI varies across the
performance of: (A) A function or activity involving the use· or
disclosure of individually identifiable health information, including
claims processing or administration .... ").
69.

Id. Generally, authorizations are required before protected health
information may be disclosed by covered entities. See id. at §§
164.502(a), 164.508(a).
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PHI disclosed in social networking in two ways. First, traditional
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networking is largely unrestricted by state and even national
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(1971) (noting that privacy rights are usually. determined by law of the
state where the plaintiff vyas domiciled if the matter complained of was
published in that state).
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similarly, fragmented protection for PHI shared in social networking
should also be unacceptable.
These protections, which are not
nationally consistent, do not align with the reality that social
networking is largely umestricted by state and national borders.s5
The need for protection of PHI in social networking is not limited
to a particular state, as these issues regularly traverse state borders.s 6
Consider, for example, Proto v. Hamic, s7 a Connecticut case in which
a martial arts instructor brought an action against a former student
who had moved to Texas.ss The instructor alleged that the student,
while residing in Texas, posted unfavorable content about him on the
student's Facebook and Twitter accounts.s9 The court found personal
jurisdiction under Connecticut's long-arm statute, holding that
because the student knew the teacher was a Connecticut resident, and
because the social networking postings could result in a harm to the
teacher in Connecticut, the long-arm provision for committing "a
tortious act within the state" was satisfied. 90 When discussing online
issues, state lines cease to carry the same weight as in the non-cyber
world. 91
Despite social networking's ability to transcended geographic
borders, protections for users are still affected by geography, even
within states. One example illustrative of this artificial division is
California users' inability to determine what uses of their likenesses or
posted information are permissible. Compare, for example, Cohen v.
FacebookfJ 2 with Fraley v. Facebook. 93
Both cases arose in the
Northern District of California, but in different divisions: Cohen in
the San Francisco division and Fraley in the San Jose division. 94
Interestingly, even this small geographic distinction resulted in
85.

See supra note 19

86. . See supra note 19.
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differing outcomes. Both cases concerned the use of Facebook users'
profile pictures for promotion of a new Facebook function.
In Cohen, users' names and pictures were distributed to others
through a "Friend Finder" function designed to attract new users by
linking current users to other people who they might know. 95 Gaining
additional users resulted in more advertising revenue for Facebook96
Ultimately, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for
misappropriation of their likenesses and unfair emichment. 97
In Fraley, users' names and profile pictures were paired with
products and companies they had "liked," which were then displayed
to the users' friends. 9s In contrast to Cohen, the Fraley plaintiffs'
claims of misappropriation and unjust emichment were allowed to
move forward. 99
The two claims were notably similar: both alleged Facebook had
misappropriated the users' likenesses and unjustly benefitted from
that use. 100 Both also took issue with Facebook's conduct because of
the ultimate economic advantage to Facebook. 101 Yet, the cases were
inconsistently resolved. 102 Cases like these underscore the difficulty
for individuals and social networking sites alike to know what is an
appropriate use of personal information under the current legal
framework.
2.

Imperfect Application: The Limits of Physical Space and
Retrospective Causes of Action

The traditional causes of action available to plaintiffs are ill-fitted
to this virtual world. Causes of action such as intrusion upon
seclusion· and defamation are often used in attempts to address
wrongs arising from inappropriate disclosure of personal information
online. 103 Scholars have observed that these traditional causes of
action apply imperfectly, if at all, to privacy needs in an online social
Two primary shortcomings highlight this
networking setting. 104
imperfect fit. First, these traditional causes of action focus on privacy

87.

See Proto, supra note 18, at *1.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at *1-2 ("[T]he plaintiff alleges that the defendant 'has designed and
orchestrated an extensive campaign, using the Internet, to disseminate
false, misleading, and disparaging information about [the plaintiffj, and
[the plaintiffj 's businesses, for the purpose of damaging [the plaintiffj 's
professional reputation, driving away [the plaintiff] 's clients and
affiliates, and gaining an unfair competitive advantage."') (citation
omitted).

96.

Id.

97.

Id. at *3.

98.

Fraley, 830 F.Supp.2d at 797.

99.

Id. at 815.

90.

Id. at *10-26.

100. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790.

91.

See supra note 19.

101. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790.

92.

Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2011).

102. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790.

93,

Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

103. See Abril, supra note 19, at 78-80 (discussing traditional torts and their
potential application in the online realm).

94.

Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164; Fraley, 830 F.Supp.2d 785.

104. See supra notes 19-20.
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95.

Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *2.
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similarly, fragmented protection for PHI shared in social networking
should also be unacceptable.
These protections, which are not
nationally consistent, do not align with the reality that social
networking is largely unrestricted by state and national borders.s 5
The need for protection of PHI in social networking is not limited
to a particular state, as these issues regularly traverse state b or ders. S6
Consider, for example, Proto v. Hamic, s7 a Connecticut case in which
a martial arts instructor brought an action against a former student
who had moved to Texas.ss The instructor alleged that the student,
while residing in Texas, posted unfavorable content about him on the
student's Facebook and Twitter accounts.sg The court found personal
jurisdiction under Connecticut's long-arm statute, holding that
because the student knew the teacher was a Connecticut resident, and
because the social networking postings could result in a harm to the
teacher in Connecticut, the long-arm provision for committing "a
tortious act within the state" was satisfied.go When discussing online
issues, state lines cease to carry the same weight as in the non-cyber
world.g 1
Despite social networking's ability to transcended geographic
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within states. One example illustrative of this artificial division is
California users' inability to determine what uses of their likenesses or
posted information are permissible. Compare, for example, Cohen v.
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differing outcomes. Both cases concerned the use of Facebook users'
profile pictures for promotion of a new Facebook function.
In Cohen, users' names and pictures were distributed to others
through a "Friend Finder" function designed to attract new users by
linking current users to other people who they might know.g5 Gaining
additional users resulted in more advertising revenue for Facebookg6
Ultimately, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for
misappropriation of their likenesses and unfair enrichment.g7
In Fraley, users' names and profile pictures were paired with
products and companies they had "liked," which were then displayed
to the users' friends.gs In contrast to Cohen, the Fraley plaintiffs'
claims of misappropriation and unjust enrichment were allowed to
move forward. gg
The two claims were notably similar: both alleged Facebook had
misappropriated the users' likenesses and unjustly benefitted from
that use. 100 Both also took issue with Facebook's conduct because of
the ultimate economic advantage to Facebook. 101 Yet, the cases were
inconsistently resolved. 102 Cases like these underscore the difficulty
for individuals and social networking sites alike to know what is an
appropriate use of personal information under the current legal
framework.
2.

Imperfect Application: The Limits of Physical Space and
Retrospective Causes of Action

The traditional causes of action available to plaintiffs are ill-fitted
to this virtual world.
Causes of action such as intrusibn upon
seclusion · and defamation are often used in attempts to address
wrongs arising from inappropriate disclosure of personal information
online. 103 Scholars have observed that these traditional causes of
action apply imperfectly, if at all, to privacy needs in an online social
Two primary shortcomings highlight this
networking setting. 104
imperfect fit. First, these traditional causes of action focus on privacy

85.

See supra note 19

86.

See supra note 19.

87.

See Proto, supra note 18, at *1.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at *1-2 ("[T]he plaintiff alleges that the defendant 'has designe~ and
orchestrated an extensive campaign, using the Internet, to dissemmate
false, misleading, and disparaging information about [the plaintiffj, and
[the plaintiffj 's businesses, for the purpose of damaging [the plaintiffj 's
professional reputation, driving away [the plaintiffj 's clients and
affiliates, and gaining an unfair competitive advantage."') (citation
omitted).

96.

Id.

97.

Id. at *3.

98.

Fraley, 830 F.Supp.2d at 797.

99.

Id. at 815.

90.

Id. at *10-26.

100. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790.

91.

See supra note 19.

101. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790.

92.

Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2011).

102. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790.

93,

Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

103. See Abril, supra note 19, at 78-80 (discussing traditional torts and their
potential application in the online realm).

94.

Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164; Fraley, 830 F.Supp.2d 785.
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with regard to physical space, 105 which is largely incompatible with an
online setting. Second, these causes of action are retrospective rather
than preventative. 106
First, the focus on physical space does not comport with the
online medium. Traditionally, privacy has focused on control of
physical space. 107 Privacy could be attained through an individual's
ability to control access to his physical space or to control the
distribution of information about himself within that space. 108 The
tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion epitomizes the traditional focus on
physical space in privacy protection. An actor is liable for invasion of
privacy when he "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns .
. . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. "109
While the definition provides that the intrusion could be a physical
intrusion or "otherwise," courts have not expanded this concept
beyond its traditional basis in physical space. 110
This physical space framework is a poor fit for social networking.
Online social networking is conducted in cyberspace; a virtual world
that does not fit within the physical bounds that this cause of action
envisions. 111 In addition, social networking is predicated on sharing
information, 112 which is antithetical to seclusion. 113 Social networking

is a rapidly evolving area that implicates PHI protections. 114
Traditional causes of action based in concepts of physical space fail to
protect this highly valued category of information. 115
The second reason these traditional causes of action apply
imperfectly to social networking is that they are retrospective privacy
protections. Adherence to retrospective measures ignores the reality
that they provide little actual remedy for harms based on disclosure
of information online. The traditional common law causes of action
fall short because they are retrospective, thus, providing protection
only in the form of causes of action arising after privacy is invaded. 116
Defamation provides an example of retrospective protection. 117 A
suit for defamation is a poor response to the actual harm that results
when such statements are posted online. As illustrated in in Proto v.
Hamic. 118 the defendant posted many negative remarks about his
former teacher on Facebook and Twitter.11 9 Information posted online
can have a disturbing permanence. 120 Not only do sites limit users'
abilities to delete information, 121 but it may also be impossible to
trace where the information has spread. 122 Even if th~ teacher
prevailed and the student removed the posting, the comments could
have already spread beyond that site and may cause . continual
damage to the teacher's reputation.

105. See Abril, supra note 19, at 79-80 (discussing how a plaintiff would need
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a physical area to bring an action
under traditional tort laws); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652 (1977).
106. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining
"defamatory communication" and discussing how the communication
must have actually been made).
107. See supra notes 19-20.
108. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 19 at 79 (discussing expectations of privacy
in traditional tort law).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).

113. Id.
114. See infra Part III.
115. There has been an increased emphasis on moving away from "physicalspace-based" privacy torts to better reflect the reality of privacy in the
social networking arena. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 19; Kiggins, supra
note 19; and Terry, supra note 76.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (examples include
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light
privacy).
117. Id. ("A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him.").

11 O. This is evidenced by a LexisN exis search, returning only 21 results from
a search of federal and state cases combined with the terms intrusion
w/2 seclusion AND ("social network" OR Facebook OR Twitter OR
Google). Of these results, only one case is relevant: Maremont v. Susan
Fredman Design Group, Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140446, *21 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011), (dismissing claim for intrusion upon
seclusion on basis of information shared on Facebook and Twitter being
"not private").

120. See supra note 5,

111. Fact Sheet, supra note 18 (detailing Facebook's on.line operation model).

121. Id.

112. Fact
Sheet,
FACEBOOK
(Oct.
9,
2011,
3:14
PM),
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (Facebook's selfidentified purpose is to "facilitate the sharing of information through the
social graph, the digital mapping of people's real-world social
connections. Anyone can sign up for Facebook and interact with the
people they know in a trusted environment.").

122. Georgina Pradhan, Analysis: New EU Data Laws Command the Tide
But Not the Cost, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2012, 1:02 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-europe-data-legislationidUSTRE80Ml VL20120124 (discussing likely difficulty of enforcement of
new E.U. data-protection proposals due in part to inability to trace and
totally remove contested information).
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118. See supra Part II.B.1; Proto, supra note 18, at *1-2.
119. Proto, supra note 18, at *1-2
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The second reason these traditional causes of action apply
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-europe-data-legislationidUSTRE80Ml VL20120124 (discussing likely difficulty of enforcement of
new E.U. data-protection proposals due in part to inability to trace and
totally remove contested information).
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Retrospective causes of action provide little if any protection
before the inflicted harm in the social networking context. Despite a
potential deterrent effect, these causes of action do not effectively
respond once information has been posted, nor do they prevent all
postings. There is relatively little case law on the subject, i23 which
results in a lack of guidance for users and sites alike. With the
potential for unwanted and unwarranted disclosure of information
that brings with it an inability to delete the data,i 24 PHI protection
becomes a paramount concern. The spread of information as personal
and valued as health information can cause particular harm. i25 If PHI
is disclosed beyond its intended audience, the harm could include
embarrassment, damage to relationships, and the impugning of
reputations-the kinds of wrongs not easily remedied, if at all, and
even less so in retrospect. i26 Once harmful information is disclosed
online, it is difficult to trace its spread, and nearly impossible to
remove. i27 To wait until the damage is done may result in no remedy
at all.

Ill.

PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION SHARED THROUGH
SOCIAL NETWORKING DESERVES PROTECTIONS

American society values protecting privacy through control over
personal information and, specifically, control over PHI.1 28 However,
this value is being challenged by the swift evolution of social
networking. This area raises challenges in new and unfamiliar ways.
Preservation of this value will require significant attention fo this
rapid evolution, and protection should be extended to PHI on social
networking sites for two reasons. First, extending protections to PHI
shared in social networking would respect realities ignored by current
law. Second, without protections, the disconnect between expected
and actual privacy will harm users through unanticipated PHI
disclosures.
123. For examples of case law on point, see, e.g.,Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011); Fraley
v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
124. See supra note 5.
125. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most
sensitive.").
126. See id.at 82,465 ("[M]alicious or inquisitive persons may download
medical records for purposes ranging from identity theft to
embarrassment to prurient interest in the life of a celebrity or
neighbor.").
127. See supra note 5; and Pradhan, supra note 122.
128. See supra Part I.
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Social Networking Realities

The swift evolution of social networking has produced four
realities. First, social networking is on the rise. i29 Second social
. va1uabl e. i 3o Thir d , users expect that they have 'control
net worki ng is
ov~r the .information they share. 131
Fourth, this expectation of
privacy IS undermined by the sites' conflicting privacy
representations. i32
Soeial networking is on the rise. 133
Sites like Facebook 134
Twitter, 135 . a~d Google, 136 which have become ubiquitous, bo~st
membership m the hundreds of millions. 137 Social networking has
become a coIDIIlon method of interaction and shows no signs of
.
~ba t•mg..i38 0 n~ po~s1ble
way to address harms incurred by sharing
mformat10n onlme is to warn a user against posting anything that
us~r would not want shared with the world, a "just don't post it"
ph1l~sophy: However, while controlling personal information by not
postmg might be one way to fit into the current law this is
'
unrealistic and ignores social networking's pervasiveness.
129. See, e'.g., @Twitter, supra note 4 (detailing increases in Twitter users
and accounts).
130. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
133. See @Twitter, supra note 4 (detailing increases in Twitter users and
accounts).
134. See Monica Hesse, Status Symbol: Facebook Is Ubiquitous But Is It
Really an Antisoc~al Network?, WASH. POST. (July 23, 2010),'
http://www.washmgtonpost.com/wpdyn/ cont~nt/ art~cle/2010 /0! /22/ AR20100072206154.html
(describing
Facebook s massive popularity and prevalence in modern society).
135. T-WITTER: The Fastest Growing Social Platform, GLOBAL WEBINDEX,
http://globalwebindex.net/wpc~~tent/uploads/downloa~s/2?13/0~/Twitter_GWI_2013.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2013) ( Twitter is now the fastest growing social
pla~form increasing 403 between Q[uarter] 2 and Q[uarter] 4[,] 2012.
This means there are now 485m[illion] account holders and 288 m[illion]
active users.").
136. Richard Siklos, Ubiquitious? Omniscient? It Must Be Google,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 2, 2003 12:01 A),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2867734/Ubiquitous-Omniscient-Itmust~be-Google.html (discussing Google and its history of privacy
practices) .
137. See Key Facts, supra note 3; and @Twitter, supra note 4.
138. See @Twitter, supra note 4 (showing the number of Twitter users
growing each year).
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Second, social networking is valuable. In today's internet-based
society, social networking sites serve important roles-creating
opportunities for building identity, dignity, and intimacy. 139 Social
networking has also expanded beyond the social capacity, becoming a
tool for business, marketing, news, and politics. 140
This trend
continues to escalate, and accordingly, social media will likely
continue to permeate interpersonal interactions.
Third, users expect that they have control over the information
they share. 141 While there are disagreements over whether privacy
can actually exist in the context of social networking interactions, 142
those who participate in social networks experience real feelings of
protectiveness of their online "space" and the information they share
in that space. 143 These feelings are supported by the sites' reassuring
privacy jargon. 144
Sites market themselves as providing an
opportunity to share personal information and develop personal
relationships in a "trusted environment. "145 For example, Google
recently launched a promotion for its Google+ platform, which
includes "Circles. "146 Google promoted this feature as "sharing but like

real life, "147 purporting to allow users to selectively share information
with only certain contacts, just as they would divide their social
This approach equates cyberspace to real space,
groups offline. 148
creating a feeling of security akin to sitting in a virtual living room
talking to a set group of friends. 149 This sense of security in online
sharing renders users vulnerable to unintended disclosures of
information, especially when these very public advertisements are only
part of the reality. 150
Fourth, despite this emphasis on control and privacy, the reality
is that much privacy control is subject to the sites' discretion. 151 For
example, in addition to its "Circles" promotions, 152 Google has
recently begun to alert users to impending changes in its privacy
policy. 153 These changes include an increase in the information that is
connected across various platforms 154-without users' consent 155 or

139. Abril, supra note 19, at 83-87 (detailing four primary reasons for
increasing online privacy protection: the promotion of identity; dignity;
intimacy and socialization; and discourse).
140. Facebook Public Policy Europe, Measuring Facebook's Economic
Impact in Europe, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://newsroom.fb.com/Whats-New-Home-Page/Measuring-Facebooks-economic-impact-in-Europe-ae.aspx ("Citizens can now speak directly
to their leaders, new political movements are born online, and a single
voice can reach an audience of millions."). See also, @Twitter, supra
note 4; Tweet, tweet! Using Twitter to Build Career Connections Now,
supra note 6, at 8; Dysart, supra note 6, at 32.
141. See, e.g., Levin & Abril, supra note 30 (demonstrating findings of an
empirical study showing that users have expectations of privacy over
what they share via social media).
142. Abril, supra note 19, at 73 ("[S]ome subscribe to the notion that online
privacy is non-existent and its protection, whether legal or practical, is
therefore futile.").
143. Id. (citing users' "feeling[s] of intrusion when their online personae are
discovered by ... unintended audiences").
144. See, e.g., Facebook Reveals 'Simplified' Privacy Changes, supra note 3
(praising increased privacy settings options but criticizing overlooking
sale of personal data to advertisers); and Bankston, supra note 3
(criticizing new Facebook privacy changes as "clearly intended to push
Facebook users to publicly share even more information than before"
and reducing user control over "personal data") (emphasis in original).
145. See Fact Sheet, supra note 112 (discussing how Facebook advertises its
service as being able to interact with friends in a trusted environment).

147. Id. ("Sharing but like real life." quote appears at time code 1:21).
148. Id.
149. See Harvest Zhang, Google+ and Circles: Why Keeping Social Groups
Separate Is Highly Necessary and Why Facebook's Retaliatory "Friends
Lists" Fail, NETWORK20Q ELE 281 CLASS BLOG (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:16
PM), http://scenic.princeton.edu/network20q/blog/?p=61
(for an
example of this perception).
150. See, e.g., Miguel Helli, Facebook Acknowledges Privacy Issue with
Applications, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2010 11:58 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/facebook-admits-to-privacyissue-and-makes-fixes/ (describing public response to Facebook giving
users' personal information to advertisers and other third parties).
151. See supra note 5. See also One Policy, One Google Experience, GOOGLE
POLICIES & PRINCIPLES, http://www.google.com/intljen/policies/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2012) (explaining the upcoming compulsory change to
privacy policy and terms of use).
152. See Helft, supra note 150.
153. Tim Carmody, Google Streamlines Privacy Policy to Integrate Its
Products, WIRED (Jan. 24, 2012, 6:16 PM),
http://www.wired.com/business/2012/01/google-streamlines-privacy /
(discussing Google's new integrated privacy policy and corresponding
privacy alert system).
154. Tom McCarthy, Google's New 'Tailored' Privacy Policy: How to
Circumvent the Rules, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 29, 2012, 3:18 PM EST),
http:/ /www.guardian.co.uk/technology /us-newsblog/2012/feb/29 /google-privacy-policy-tips-and-tricks (When users are
signed in to Google, the new policy will permit Google to "do things like
suggest search queries - or tailor your search results - based on the
interests you've expressed [in Google+, Gmail, and YouTube.]").
155, Mat Honan, Google's Broken Promise: The End of "Don't Be Evil",
GIZMODO (Jan. 24, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5878987 /its-

146. See Google, supra note 8.
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141. See, e.g., Levin & Abril, supra note 30 (demonstrating findings of an
empirical study showing that users have expectations of privacy over
what they share via social media).
142. Abril, supra note 19, at 73 ("[S]ome subscribe to the notion that online
privacy is non-existent and its protection, whether legal or practical, is
therefore futile.").
143. Id. (citing users' "feeling[s] of intrusion when their online personae are
discovered by ... unintended audiences").
144. See, e.g., Facebook Reveals 'Simplified' Privacy Changes, supra note 3
(praising increased privacy settings options but criticizing overlooking
sale of personal data to advertisers); and Bankston, supra note 3
(criticizing new Facebook privacy changes as "clearly intended to push
Facebook users to publicly share even more information than before"
and reducing user control over "personal data") (emphasis in original).
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This approach equates cyberspace to real space,
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ability to opt-out. 156 Obtuse and convoluted policies make it more
difficult to determine the level of control individuals retain over
privacy settings and other users' access to their information. Not
only are these policies dominated by legal terminology and difficult to
understand, but scholars have also suggested that most users do not
read them, 157 and, if they did, the opportunities cost for reading these
policies would approximate $780 billion annually for American users
alone. 158
B.

The Privacy Disconnect and Resulting Harms to Users

The disconnect between users' expectations of control of
information in social networking settings and the reality of its limits
are likely to result in a myriad of harms to users. Three examples
provide a sampling of these potential harms.
First, consider the storage of information on social networking
sites. Urban legend-backed by truth-tells that nothing can ever
truly be deleted from users' online personas. 159 Facebook itself
cautions users of this fact, noting, "Even after you remove
information from your profile or delete your account, copies of that
information may remain viewable elsewhere. "160 An individual could
attempt to take control of his information by removing it from a
social networking site, only to be frustrated by a programmed
inability to achieve that goal.
official-google-is-evil-nowid. ("If you use Google's services, you have to
agree to this new privacy policy.").
156. For the purposes of this note, "opt out" means zero-participation in or
consent to the Google privacy policy. Google does assert that there are
methods to "opt out" for certain mobile devices. See Anonymous
Identifiers on Mobile Devices, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
policies/technologies/ads/ (last visited. Mar. 3, 2013).
157. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J .L. & Pol'y for Info. Soc'y 543, 564-67 (~00809) (discussing the costs associated with taking the time to read pnvacy
policies).
158. Id. (advocating that an online privacy system requiring users to read
lengthy and complex privacy policies to preserve their rights is too
costly, and that companies should find ways to convey privacy practices
"in useable ways, which includes reducing the time it takes to read
policies").
159. For an illustrative example, see Internet Archive, The Wayback
Machine, ARCHIVE.ORG, http://archive.org/web/web.php (last visited
Mar. 3, 2013) (the "Wayback Machine" is an internet archive cataloging
over 2 billion webpages).
160. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 270, 6-7 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2010)
(citing . Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (revised April 22, 2010)).
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Next, consider changing privacy policies that result in disclosure
beyond what the individual intended. Social networking sites' welldocumented and contentious practice of changing their privacy
settings seemingly overnight is just another of the potential snares for
social networking users. 161 These changes are often implemented
without significant warning or user input, and often go into effect
before users are aware of them. 162 Google's recent privacy changes
provide an example. 163 Users have the benefit of advanced notice in
this instance, but lack the ability to opt-out of the increased crossplatform sharing of information. 164 Many sites have not afforded users
the same level of alerts before a change in policies. 165 For example,
Facebook has a history of changing privacy settings in such a way as
to render privately held information public. 166
Privacy setting changes of this nature can mean that an
individual user may· have taken all the available protective steps, but
still have their personal information disclosed beyond their intended
audience.
While the recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
settlements address these issues retrospectively, 167 the threat of future
disclosures from social networking sites remains.
Although the
settlement agreements place stringent privacy requirements on
Facebook and Google for the next twenty years, these requirements
161. Discontent
supra note
settlement
(discussion

with such practices has seen discussion for several years. See
149 Meanwhile, there has been no resolution until the recent
agreement with the F.T.C. See Protalinski, supra note 3
the settlement).

162. See, e.g., Low v. Linkedin Corp., 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2012 WL 2873847
(N.D. Cal. 2012) ("As noted by Defendant, although the Amended
Complaint describes the terms of Defendant's privacy policy in detail,
Plaintiffs never allege that they were aware of the privacy policy, let
alone saw or read it.").
163. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (July 27, 2012), http://www.google.com/
policies/ privacy/.
164. Id. (noting failure to provide a means for opting-out of information
sharing).
165. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 96 (W.D.Pa. 2010)
(discussing implications of website privacy policy); see also FTC Gives
Final Approval to Settlement with Google over Buzz Rollout, FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/
buzz.shtm (noting that even Google did not provide such alerts to its
users before rolling out its social networking feature, Buzz, in 2010,
providing the impetus for the charges and recent settlement with the
F.T.C).
166. Cf. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc ..i 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (determining whether [plaintiff's] privacy settings rendered
[his] wall postings and comments public).
167. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement).
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lengthy and complex privacy policies to preserve their. rights lS .too
costly, and that companies should find ways to convey privacy practices
"in useable ways, which includes reducing the time it takes to read
policies").
159. For an illustrative example, see Internet Archive, The Wayback
Machine, ARCHIVE.ORG, http://archive.org/web/web.php (last visited
Mar. 3, 2013) (the "Wayback Machine" is an internet archive cataloging
over 2 billion webpages).
160. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 270, 6-7 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2010)
(citing . Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (revised April 22, 2010)).
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Next, consider changing privacy policies that result in disclosure
beyond what the individual intended. Social networking sites' welldocumented and contentious practice of changing their privacy
settings seemingly overnight is just another of the potential snares for
social networking users. 161 These changes are often implemented
without significant warning or user input, and often go into effect
before users are aware of them. 162 Google's recent privacy changes
provide an example. 163 Users have the benefit of advanced notice in
this instance, but lack the ability to opt-out of the increased crossplatform sharing of information. 164 Many sites have not afforded users
the same level of alerts before a change in policies. 165 For example,
Facebook has a history of changing privacy settings in such a way as
to render privately held information public. 166
Privacy setting changes of this nature can mean that an
individual user may· have taken all the available protective steps, but
still have their personal information disclosed beyond their intended
audience.
While the recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
settlements address these issues retrospectively, 167 the threat of future
disclosures from social networking sites remains.
Although the
settlement agreements place stringent privacy requirements on
Facebook and Google for the next twenty years, these requirements
161. Discontent
supra note
settlement
(discussion

with such practices has seen discussion for several years. See
149 Meanwhile, there has been no resolution until the recent
agreement with the F.T.C. See Protalinski, supra note 3
the settlement).

162. See, e.g., Low v. Linkedln Corp., 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2012 WL 2873847
(N.D. Cal. 2012) ("As noted by Defendant, although the Amended
Complaint describes the terms of Defendant's privacy policy in detail,
Plaintiffs never allege that they were aware of the privacy policy, let
alone saw or read it.").
163. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (July 27, 2012), http://www.google.com/
policies/privacy/.
164. Id. (noting failure to provide a means for opting-out of information
sharing).
165. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 96 (W.D.Pa. 2010)
(discussing implications of website privacy policy); see also FTC Gives
Final Approval to Settlement with Google over Buzz Rollout, FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/
buzz.shtm (noting that even Google did not provide such alerts to its
users before rolling out its social networking feature, Buzz, in 2010,
providing the impetus for the charges and recent settlement with the
F.T.C).
166. Cf. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (determining whether [plaintiff's] privacy settings rendered
[his] wall postings and comments public).
167. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement).

433

4 ·No. 2 · 2013
Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking

4 ·No. 2 · 2013
Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL.

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL.

are based on harms from site components that are, in several
instances, already obsolete. 168 This rapid change further illustrates
the need for protections based on categories of information and not on
specific technological practices.
Fourth, consider the sale of information to third party sites, a
practice that has been going on behind the scenes for years. 169 Sites
have advertised privacy controls to users while selling or otherwise
distributing information outside the realm of the social networking
site. 170 This practice results in personal information being spread far
beyond users' expectations or awareness.
From the control-as-privacy perspective, the storage, compromise,
and sale of information in social networking give cause for concern.
In the future, what will social networking sites do with stored
information? What if the site is compromised or sold? What if a user
takes all available precautions, or sends information in a private
message, and the information is still compromised?
Current law does not provide a satisfactory answer to these
The fact remains that information spread
potential problems.
through online social networking can reach beyond the intended
audience. 171 Ignoring the hazards the online world poses will not
protect individuals, their privacy, or their PHI; these threats must be
confronted. The recent FTC settlements with Facebook and Google
validate both the reality of these harms and the legitimacy of the
users' interests. 172 Courts and legislatures, however, have not kept
pace with these expectations, 173 and retrospective solutions such as the
FTC settlements offer insufficient protection. 174 Bridging this gap will

require more than retrospective causes of action based on the
antiquated constraints of physical space and applied to artificial
boundaries-it will require a national solution in the form of
preventative federal regulations that can adapt to the current and
developing problems of protecting PHI in social networking.

168. Id.
169. See supra note 149.
170. See supra note 149.
171. For example, the capacity to "retweet" information can send a post
viral. See Dan Zarrella, The Science of ReTweets, MASHABLE (Feb. 17,
2009), http://mashable.com/2009/02/17 /twitter-retweets/ (analyzing
how Twitter posts go viral).
172. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement). See also In
the Matter of Google, Inc., Federal Trade Comm'n, File No. 102 3136,
available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/
110330googlebuzzagreeorder. pdf.
173. See, e.g., McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 Pa. Dist. &
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2010) ("The relationships to be
fostered through those media are basic friendships, not attorney-client,
physician-patient, or psychologist-patient types of relationships, and
while one may expect that his friend will hold certain information in
confidence, the maintenance of one's friendships typically does not
depend on confidentiality.").
174. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement).
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IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: FEDERAL REGULATIONS

Americans value protection of privacy. 175 Americans also value
Social networking is
preserving individual control over PHI.1 76
ubiquitous and is here to stay. 177 This three-way confluence of privacy
values, PHI protection, and expansion of social networking is an
intersection in which problems will develop if not given proper
attention. 178 While online social networking has positive aspects, 179 its
potential dangers should be addressed preemptively. With the lack of
meaningful protections from current federal regulations and state
laws, 180 there is a strong need for forward-thinking, preventative
measures to protect this highly valued, vulnerable category of
information. This Part first discusses how a comprehensive set of
federal regulations could fill this need. Next, it outlines the
advantages of this regulatory solution.
A.

Proposed Regulations

To more effectively protect personal health information shared in
online social networking settings, HHS should build on the "floor"
described in the HIP AA Privacy Rule and promulgate additional
federal regulations. 181 In designing these regulations, HHS should allow
individuals to retain a right of control over their personal health
information by virtue of the character of the information itself.
One of the arguments against federal regulations for privacy
protection of information shared in social networking is that this
industry's vast scope would make the regulations impossible to
enforce and therefore render them powerless. 182 A similar criticism
175. See supra Part I.
176. See supra Part I.
177. See supra Part III.A.
178. See supra Part III.
179. See supra Part III.A.
180. See supra Part IL
181. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 ("[T]he
Privacy Rule creates, for the first time, a floor of national protections
for the privacy of [consumers'] most sensitive information-health
information.").
182. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 76. See also Gilman & Cooper, supra note
24.
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are based on harms from site components that are, in several
instances, already obsolete. 168 This rapid change further illustrates
. the need for protections based on categories of information and not on
specific technological practices.
Fourth, consider the sale of information to third party sites, a
practice that has been going on behind the scenes for years. 169 Sites
have advertised privacy controls to users while selling or otherwise
distributing information outside the realm of the social networking
site. 170 This practice results in personal information being spread far
beyond users' expectations or awareness.
From the control-as-privacy perspective, the storage, compromise,
and sale of information in social networking give cause for concern.
In the future, what will social networking sites do with stored
information? What if the site is compromised or sold? What if a user
takes all available precautions, or sends information in a private
message, and the information is still compromised?
Current law does not provide a satisfactory answer to these
The fact remains that information spread
potential problems.
through online social networking can reach beyond the intended
audience. 171 Ignoring the hazards the online world poses will not
protect individuals, their privacy, or their PHI; these threats must be
confronted. The recent FTC settlements with Facebook and Google
validate both the reality of these harms and the legitimacy of the
users' interests. 172 Courts and legislatures, however, have not kept
pace with these expectations, 173 and retrospective solutions such as the
FTC settlements offer insufficient protection. 174 Bridging this gap will
168. Id.
169. See supra note 149.
170. See supra note 149.
171. For example, the capacity to "retweet" information can send a post
viral. See Dan Zarrella, The Science of ReTweets, MASHABLE (Feb. 17,
2009), http://mashable.com/2009/02/17 /twitter-retweets/ (analyzing
how Twitter posts go viral).
172. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement). See also In
the Matter of Google, Inc., Federal Trade Comm'n, File No. 102 3136,
available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/
110330googlebuzzagreeorder. pdf.
173. See, e.g., McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 Pa. Dist. &
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2010) ("The relationships to be
fostered through those media are basic friendships, not attorney-client,
physician-patient, or psychologist-patient types of relationships, and
while one may expect that his friend will hold certain information in
confidence, the maintenance of one's friendships typically does not
depend on confidentiality.").
174. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement).
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require more than retrospective causes of action based on the
antiquated constraints of physical space and applied to artificial
boundaries-it will require a national solution in the form of
preventative federal regulations that can adapt to the current and
developing problems of protecting PHI in social networking.

IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: FEDERAL REGULATIONS

Americans value protection of privacy. 175 Americans also value
preserving individual control over PHI. 176
Social networking is
ubiquitous and is here to stay. 177 This three-way confluence of privacy
values, PHI protection, and expansion of social networking is an
intersection in which problems will develop if not given proper
attention. 178 While online social networking has positive aspects, 179 its
potential dangers should be addressed preemptively. With the lack of
meaningful protections from current federal regulations and state
laws, 180 there is a strong need for forward-thinking, preventative
measures to protect this highly valued, vulnerable category of
information. This Part first discusses how a comprehensive set of
federal regulations could fill this need. Next, it outlines the
advantages of this regulatory solution.
A.

Proposed Regulations

To more effectively protect personal health information shared in
online social networking settings, HHS should build on the "floor"
described in the HIP AA Privacy Rule and promulgate additional
federal regulations. 181 In designing these regulations, HHS should allow
individuals to retain a right of control over their personal health
information by virtue of the character of the information itself.
One of the arguments against federal regulations for privacy
protection of information shared in social networking is that this
industry's vast scope would make the regulations impossible to
enforce and therefore render them powerless. 182 A similar criticism
175. See supra Part I.
176. See supra Part I.
177. See supra Part III.A.
178. See supra Part III.
179. See supra Part III.A.
180. See supra Part II.
181. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 ("[T]he
Privacy Rule creates, for the first time, a floor of national protections
for the privacy of [consumers'] most sensitive information-health
information.").
182. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 76. See also Gilman & Cooper, supra note
24.
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was advanced against the recently proposed data laws in the
European Union, arguing the standards imposed would prove too
difficult for compliance. 183 Accepting the premise that "it would be
nearly impossible to trace all the places information may have spread
after disclosure" 184 underscores the need for preventative components
to the proposed regulations. However, if the regulations were modeled
on the value of protecting PHI based on its inherent characteristics,
they would be able to regulate use of the information for broad
categories of actors by providing guidance before inappropriate
disclosure occurs.
Because the regulations would address uses pertaining to PHI,
HSS should bear the responsibility of drafting and promulgating the
regulations. As the agency with the most experience handling issues
related to PHI, 185 HHS is best equipped to draft informed, meaningful
regulations in this area. The definition of PHI should be similar to
that articulated under HIP AA. 186 PHI should be defined as any
information that relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual. 187 This includes a wide
range of information that could be identified through filters and
screening processes by the sites. Examples include, but are not
limited to, an individual posting about a physician appointment, the
cold they had last week, a friend's surgery, or other health-related
postings.
As part of the regulations, HHS should establish
administrative tribunals responsible for hearing complaints under
these regulations.
These regulations should employ a three-pronged approach. First,
the regulations should require meaningful privacy disclosures and
truthful advertising from social networking sites.
Second, the
regulations should provide guidelines for· the use of any PHI shared
and collected on social networking sites. Third, the regulations
should establish several courses of action and meaningful· remedies for

both individual social networking users and for social networking
sites.

183. See Pradhan, supra note 122 (discussing the likelihood that enforcing
new E.U. data-protection proposals will be difficult, due in part to
inability to trace and totally remove contested information).
184. Id.
185. HHS promulgated both the HIP AA Privacy Rule and the HITECH Act,
both dealing with PHI. See 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at
82,462. See also HITECH, supra note 25.
186. HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at § 160.103.("Health information
means any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or
medium, that . . . [r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care
to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the
provision of health care to an individual.").
187. See id.
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1.

Meaningful Privacy Disclosures and Truthful Advertising

The first prong of the regulations should require social networking
sites to make meaningful, plain language privacy disclosures and to be
truthful in how they advertise users' control over privacy and use of
information. While there are many different ways this could be
accomplished, this Note proposes four "first steps" toward achieving
this goal.
First, sites should be required to make their privacy policies more
accessible to users. This could be accomplished by making the
privacy policies easier to find and understand. The sites should be
required to make the link to their privacy policies more prominent on
the site. Users should not have to painstakingly search for the website
privacy policy to find it. The policies should also be accessible in a
meaningful, plain language way. While the importance of legal
terminology in these policies cannot be overlooked, the privacy policy
should be supplemented by a version that a layperson could easily
read and understand. Access to the policies in plain language is
necessary for users to make meaningful decisions regarding the
protection of their PHI. This access should include notification-also
in plain language-that alerts users to any pending changes in the
privacy policy.
Second, users should be required to complete a series of
uncomplicated procedures before creating a profile. Initially, the user
should have to undertake a comprehensive review of the privacy
policy, rather than simply selecting a check box and clicking "I
Accept." This could be accomplished in the form of a short plainlanguage document that pops up, highlights, and then explains the
site's privacy policy and terms of use. Following review of this
document, users would be required to complete a short quiz; passing
the quiz would demonstrate an adequate understanding of the ways
the users' personal information will be used. Such a review ·and quiz
process could also be required for each user on a regular basis, or each
time the site changes its privacy policy or terms of use. A notice that
policies are changing is of little utility if users do not read or fail to
understand the policies. This tutorial should also be available to the
users any time they desire a refresher on how the site is permitted to
handle their information.
Third, the sites should be required to undertake a similar process
explaining and highlighting the user-controlled privacy settings of the
site. Four requirements would help achieve this goal. First, sites
should be required to make these explanations and settings
transparent, meaningful, and user friendly. Second, sites should be
required to make profiles' default setting private, not public. Third,
the sites should not be permitted to change a user's privacy settings
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was advanced against the recently proposed data laws in the
European Union, arguing the standards imposed would prove too
difficult for compliance. 183 Accepting the premise that "it would be
nearly impossible to trace all the places information may have spread
after disclosure" 184 underscores the need for preventative components
to the proposed regulations. However, if the regulations were modeled
on the value of protecting PHI based on its inherent characteristics,
they would be able to regulate use of the information for broad
categories of actors by providing guidance before inappropriate
disclosure occurs.
Because the regulations would address uses pertaining to PHI,
HSS should bear the responsibility of drafting and promulgating the
regulations. As the agency with the most experience handling issues
related to PHI, 185 HHS is best equipped to draft informed, meaningful
regulations in this area. The definition of PHI should be similar to
that articulated under HIP AA. 186 PHI should be defined as any
information that relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual. 187 This includes a wide
range of information that could be identified through filters and
screening processes by the sites. Examples include, but are not
limited to, an individual posting about a physician appointment, the
cold they had last week, a friend's surgery, or other health-related
postings.
As part of the regulations, HHS should establish
administrative tribunals responsible for hearing complaints under
these regulations.
These regulations should employ a three-pronged approach. First,
the regulations should require meaningful privacy disclosures and
truthful advertising from social networking sites.
Second, the
regulations should provide guidelines for the use of any PHI shared
and collected on social networking sites. Third, the regulations
should establish several courses of action and meaningful· remedies for

both individual social networking users and for social networking
sites.

183. See Pradhan, supra note 122 (discussing the likelihood that enforcing
new E.U. data-protection proposals will be difficult, due in part to
inability to trace and totally remove contested information).
184. Id.
185. HHS promulgated both the HIP AA Privacy Rule and the HITECH Act,
both dealing with PHI. See 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at
82,462. See also HITECH, supra note 25.
186. HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at § 160.103.("Health information
means any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or
medium, that . . . [r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care
to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the
provision of health care to an individual.").
187. See id.
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Meaningful Privacy Disclosures and Truthful Advertising

The first prong of the regulations should require social networking
sites to make meaningful, plain language privacy disclosures and to be
truthful in how they advertise users' control over privacy and use of
information. While there are many different ways this could be
accomplished, this Note proposes four "first steps" toward achieving
this goal.
First, sites should be required to make their privacy policies more
accessible to users. This could be accomplished by making the
privacy policies easier to find and understand. The sites should be
required to make the link to their privacy policies more prominent on
the site. Users should not have to painstakingly search for the website
privacy policy to find it. The policies should also be accessible in a
meaningful, plain language way. While the importance of legal
terminology in these policies cannot be overlooked, the privacy policy
should be supplemented by a version that a layperson could easily
read and understand. Access to the policies in plain language is
necessary for users to make meaningful decisions regarding the
protection of their PHI. This access should include notification-also
in plain language-that alerts users to any pending changes in the
privacy policy.
Second, users should be required to complete a series of
uncomplicated procedures before creating a profile. Initially, the user
should have to undertake a comprehensive review of the privacy
policy, rather than simply selecting a check box and clicking "I
Accept." This could be accomplished in the form of a short plainlanguage document that pops up, highlights, and then explains the
site's privacy policy and terms of use. Following review of this
document, users would be required to complete a short quiz; passing
the quiz would demonstrate an adequate understanding of the ways
the users' personal information will be used. Such a review and quiz
process could also be required for each user on a regular basis, or each
time the site changes its privacy policy or terms of use. A notice that
policies are changing is of little utility if users do not read or fail to
understand the policies. This tutorial should also be available to the
users any time they desire a refresher on how the site is permitted to
handle their information.
Third, the sites should be required to undertake a similar process
explaining and highlighting the user-controlled privacy settings of the
site. Four requirements would help achieve this goal. First, sites
should be required to make these explanations and settings
transparent, meaningful, and user friendly. Second, sites should be
required to make profiles' default setting private, not public. Third,
the sites should not be permitted to change a user's privacy settings
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without the user's affirmative authorization. In addition to the popup privacy policy review, any change in user-controlled privacy
settings should be subject to a similar walkthrough and would be at
the user's discretion to accept or reject. Finally, sites should be
required to give users the ability to flag or mark information as
sensitive PHI that they do not want to be distributed, and the site
should be required to review that information before proceeding with
its use or distribution.
The fourth initial step would require social networking sites to be
truthful in their advertising. 188 Sites should have to issue a disclaimer
that users should review the sites' privacy policies before posting
Sites should also be prohibited from advertising
information.
misleading levels of control over privacy and information. Depending
upon the advertisement medium, any advertisement should have to be
accompanied by a plain-language . notice that is either visible or
audible and in the same language as the predominance of the
advertisement. A site's advertisement should not leave a user with an
inaccurate understanding of the privacy or control their posts are
afforded.
2.

Guidelines for Use of Personal Health Information

The second prong of the regulations would establish guidelines for
the use of any PHI shared and collected on social networking sites.
Attaching protection to the information itself would be more
meaningful and long lasting than trying to regulate the fast-paced
evolution of the technology, while also respecting the intrinsic value
and basic premise of social networking. 189 Current federal protections
already take the approach that the PHI itself deserves protection190
and apply regulations to broad categories of health care industry
actors. 191 Regulating social networking sites' use of PHI could follow
HIP AA's approach to regulating "covered entities. "192 By the same
approach, regulating the vast network of other firms, advertisers, data

188. This portion of the regulations should be developed by HHS in
conjunction with the FTC. so that the expertise of both agencies could
be incorporated into this pivotal provision. For a summary of each
agency's areas of expertise, see About the Federal Trade Commission,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2013); What We Do, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2013).
189. See supra Part III.A.
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storage companies, and so forth, is akin to regulating "business
associates. "193
The regulations would provide guidelines to social networking
sites on what is permissible use of PHI. Social networking sites
should not· be allowed to collect or distribute this PHI from user's
profiles and interactions. The only exception to this would be if the
sites de-identified the information and no longer linked it to the
individual or his online profile or persona.
The de-identified
information could be collected and used for research purposes, but
directed advertisements should not be allowed unless requested by the
user.
The regulations should also provide guidelines to third party
companies that gather or receive information from social networking
sites. PHI should be a protected category of information that cannot
be used for marketing, advertising, or further distribution, unless the
user grants specific, informed consent. Just as the HITECH Act gives
individuals the right to know who has accessed their PHI, 194 the
proposed regulations would confer a similar right. Once PHI is
collected and distributed outside the realm of the social networking
sites themselves, users would have a right to know who else has
accessed that information. Third party companies-the "business
associates" of social networking sites-wo:u.ld still be responsible to the
users based on the nature of the PHI.
!·
3.

Available Actions and Remedies

Implementing the above-mentioned privacy disclosures and
regulations would establish a framework that would decrease the·
incidence of harm to users from PHI disclosures. It would establish
much of the needed preventative protection and decrease reliance on
less effective retrospective remedies. However, in recognizing that not
all harms can be prevented, the third prong of the regulations should
establish several courses of action and meaningful remedies for both
individual social networking users and social networking websites.
The regulations should also create a cause of action for individuals
whose PHI has been inappropriately disclosed by social networking
sites or their third party affiliates: "wrongful distribution of PHI."
Such a cause of action would abandon the constraints of traditional
causes of action and their focus on physical space.
The initial step in pursuing this cause of action should be for the
user to request an administrative preliminary injunction. A social
networking user who suspects his PHI has been compromised would
193. See supra Parts I, II.A.

190. See supra Part I.

194. HITECH Act,, 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5, §13405(c)(l)(B) (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. 17935) ("an individual shall have a right to receive
an accounting of disclosures ... ").

191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See supra Parts I, II.A.
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without the user's affirmative authorization. In addition to the popup privacy policy review, any change in user-controlled privacy
settings should be subject to a similar walkthrough and would be at
the user's discretion to accept or reject. Finally, sites should be
required to give users the ability to flag or mark information as
sensitive PHI that they do not want to be distributed, and the site
should be required to review that information before proceeding with
its use or distribution.
The fourth initial step would require social networking sites to be
truthful in their advertising. 188 Sites should have to issue a disclaimer
that users should review the sites' privacy policies before posting
Sites should also be prohibited from advertising
information.
misleading levels of control over privacy and information. Depending
upon the advertisement medium, any advertisement should have to be
accompanied by a plain-language notice that is either visible or
audible and in the same language as the predominance of the
advertisement. A site's advertisement should not leave a user with an
inaccurate understanding of the privacy or control their posts are
afforded.
2.

Guidelines for Use of Personal Health Information

The second prong of the regulations would establish guidelines for
the use of any PHI shared and collected on social networking sites.
Attaching protection to the information itself would be more
meaningful and long lasting than trying to regulate the fast-paced
evolution of the technology, while also respecting the intrinsic value
and basic premise of social networking. 189 Current federal protections
already take the approach that the PHI itself deserves protection190
and apply regulations to broad categories of health care industry
actors. 191 Regulating social networking sites' use of PHI could follow
HIP AA's approach to regulating "covered entities." 192 By the same
approach, regulating the vast network of other firms, advertisers, data

188. This portion of the regulations should be developed by HHS in
conjunction with the FTC. so that the expertise of both agencies could
be incorporated into this pivotal provision. For a summary of each
agency's areas of expertise, see About the Federal Trade Commission,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2013); What We Do, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2013).
189. See supra Part III.A.
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storage companies, and so forth, is akin to regulating "business
associates. "193
The regulations would provide guidelines to social networking
sites on what is permissible use of PHI. Social networking sites
should not· be allowed to collect or distribute this PHI from user's
profiles and interactions. The only exception to this would be if the
sites de-identified the information and no longer linked it to the
individual or his online profile or persona.
The de-identified
information could be collected and used for research purposes, but
directed advertisements should not be allowed unless requested by the
user.
The regulations should also provide guidelines to third party
companies that gather or receive information from social networking
sites. PHI should be a protected category of information that cannot
be used for marketing, advertising, or further distribution, unless the
user grants specific, informed consent. Just as the HITECH Act gives
individuals the right to know who has accessed their PHI, 194 the
proposed regulations would confer a similar right. Once PHI is
collected and distributed outside the realm of the social networking
sites themselves, users would have a right to know who else has
accessed that information. Third party companies-the "business
associates" of social networking sites-wop.ld still be responsible to the
users based on the nature of the PHI.
!:
3.

Available Actions and Remedies

Implementing the above-mentioned privacy disclosures and
regulations would establish a framework that would decrease the·
incidence of harm to users from PHI disclosures. It would establish
much of the needed preventative protection and decrease reliance on
less effective retrospective remedies. However, in recognizing that not
all harms can be prevented, the third prong of the regulations should
establish several courses of action and meaningful remedies for both
individual social networking users and social networking websites.
The regulations should also create a cause of action for individuals
whose PHI has been inappropriately disclosed by social networking
sites or their third party affiliates: "wrongful distribution of PHI."
Such a cause of action would abandon the constraints of traditional
causes of action and their focus on physical space.
The initial step in pursuing this cause of action should be for the
user to request an administrative preliminary injunction. A social
networking user who suspects his PHI has been compromised would
193. See supra Parts I, II.A.

190. See supra Part I.

194. HITECH Act,, 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5, §13405(c)(l)(B) (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. 17935) ("an individual shall have a right to receive
an accounting of disclosures ... ").

191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See supra Parts I, II.A.
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file a complaint with the administrative tribunal in his jurisdiction
designated to hear these complaints. This tribunal should evaluate
the claim in the light most favorable to the individual and could then
issue a preliminary injunction, requiring the accused site or affiliate to
remove or cease use of the contested information. The administrative
tribunal should then issue an opinion on whether the information
qualifies as PHI and, if so, whether it has been inappropriately used
or disclosed. These opinions should be published for precedential
value on which users, social networking sites, and decision-makers in
the other tribunals could rely.
Both parties would be entitled to appeal through a separate
agency arbitration process. The decisions of these arbitrations should
be reasoned awards, explaining the facts and reasons for the decision
and should be available as precedent to the tribunals.
If the
individual prevailed, he should be entitled to damages as calculated
for pain and suffering and/ or damage to reputation. 195 The social
networking site or third party affiliate should be required to stop
using the contested information. Further, the site should be required
to contact any other sites to which they distributed the information
to alert them to stop using the information. It should remain up to
the individual's discretion whether to keep the information posted on
his social networking page, but the site should not be allowed to use
that information. If the social networking site prevailed, however, it
would be entitled to use the information. Finally, appeal to the
courts would be available to the individuals and social networking·
sites.
In addition to the cause of action established primarily for the
benefit of individuals, there should also be a course of action available
to the social networking sites themselves that would aid in
understanding the limits imposed by the regulations. Sites should be
permitted to request a "ruling letter" from HHS to evaluate proposed
uses and disclosures of information. These ruling letters should serve
as advisory opinions, and could provide another preventative avenue
for decreasing harms to users. Such preventative measures would
further decrease the need for retrospective actions.

preempt disputes. Together, these benefits would result in an online
environment that aligns with users' current expectations,
meaningfully guides businesses and courts, and sets precedent to
inform future discussions as other similar issues arise.

B.

Advantages of the Proposed Regulations

These proposed regulations provide three primary benefits. First,
the regulations would fill the current gap in the law between the
realities of social networking and protections for PHI. Second, they
would provide a meaningful process to resolve disputes and obtain
remedies. Third, and most importantly, they would set out clear
expectations for all parties involved in social networking and help

1.

Fill the Current Gap in the Law Between the Realities of Social
Networking and Protections for PHI

The proposed regulations would bring protection for PHI shared
in social networking forward from where HIP AA and HITECH
stopped short. They would also eliminate the need for the fragmented
and outdated state protection. The proposed regulations would fill
the gap that has resulted from the convergence of privacy values, the
value placed on PHI, and the rapidly evolving area of social
networking.
PHI shared in social networking interactions is currently
unprotected and therefore vulnerable, especially through third-party
use. If an individual divulges PHI, even if in a forum that is not as
"traditionally" private as others are, the information still retains the
inherent character that American society feels strongly should be
The proposed regulations would update the law to
protected.
effectuate this value.
2.

Afford Meaningful Dispute Resolution Options and Remedies

Meaningful remedies do not just mean satisfaction to an injured
plaintiff; they also entail remedies that reflect the context in which
the wrong was committed. 196 · The proposed regulations outline an
efficient process for dispute resolution that recognizes the unique
character of wrongs in a social networking context. This approach
results in simplicity, uniformity, and consistency of remedies to the
advantage of all parties involved.
The proposed regulations ensure that decision-makers-the
administrative tribunals, arbitrators, and courts-would have
precedent on which to base their decisions. Complicating the current
ability to shape meaningful remedies is the phenomenon of the
"vanishing trial. "197 With more and more disputes resolved through
private methods of alternative dispute resolution, the number of
precedential decisions from the courts has diminished, especially in
the social networking context; this, in turn, has diminished the

196. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, !bi Remedium: The Fundamental Right
to A Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1642
(2004) (discussing what makes a meaningful remedy).

195. This is similar to the damages available for the tort of defamation. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 621 (1977).

197. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the 'Vanishing Trial': What We
Know-And What We Don't, 10 DrsP. RESOL. MAG. 7 (Summer 2004)
(explaining why alternative dispute resolution methods are decreasing
the frequency of trials).
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influence jurisprudence has on shaping social norms involving PHI. 198
The proposed regulations would provide decision-makers with a
foundation based in the reality of online social networking and not in
antiquated understandings of privacy based on physical space.
Requiring published, reasoned awards would provide structure and
bridge the gap left by diminishing precedential opinions.
3.

Preempt Disputes Through Clear Expectations for All Parties
Involved

Perhaps the most meaningful impact stemming from these
proposed regulations is that they would convey clear expectations for
the use of PHI disclosed in social networking. Understa!lding what is
expected regarding PHI would inform and guide the conduct of users,
the social networking sites and third-party affiliates, and would help
to preempt disputes.
The proposed reglliations would comport with many of the
expectations already held by online social networking users. 199 In
addition to meeting current expectations of privacy, meaningful
privacy disclosures would set realistic expectations for social
networking users of what is and is not protected in their online
interactions. The combination of knowledge and proposed regulatory
.protections would provide for more control over that information.
This paradigm would give users confidence in knowing both the
boundaries of protection and the limits on how their PHI can be used,
as well as comfort in knowing there are penalties for inappropriate use
and disclosure. It would also place a burden of responsibility on
users; as they are more informed, they will be expected to participate
in the responsible management of their PHI.
The proposed
regulations would set clear expectations for users and encourage
informed participation in protection of PHI.
Social networking sites and their third-party affiliates would also
benefit from the clear expectations set out in the proposed
regulations. Understanding what is permissible regarding PHI would
decrease the amount of confusion and litigation. Sites would be
better able to protect against liability by complying with the
regulations. As a result, they would be spared the costs-of money,
time, and reputation-of litigation arising from a lack of legal
guidelines. 200
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V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
Addressing the emerging issue of privacy for PHI in online social
networking will not only align with users' current privacy
expectations and quell worries about inappropriate disclosure, but also
assist in resolving similar problems in the future. This Note has
focused on PHI specifically, but the proposed regulations could also
serve as a framework for other categories of information deemed
worthy of protection. Similarly, this focus can be expanded beyond
social networking to address concerns about the practices of data
mining and usage generally. 201
CONCLUSION

Social networking challenges the value American society places on
PHI protection as a highly vulnerable category of information. With
HIP AA, the HITECH Act, and their attendant regulations confirming
this value, 202 the need for protections in social networking cannot be
overlooked. The reality of social networking's ubiquity, popularity,
and rapid evolution renders arguments such as "just don't post it"
moot. 203
PHI disclosure has a unique potential for negative
consequences; embarrassment, discrimination, and damage to
relationships are but a few of the potential harms. 204 Forwardlooking, preventative federal regulations will provide the most
protection for PHI shared in a social networking context.
Current regulations do not extend into this area. 205 Additionally,
the law varies state to state, ignoring the reality that social
Similarly,
networking is unrestricted by geographic borders. 206
frameworks rooted in a concept of physical space are a poor fit for
wrongs in the online world. 207 Finally, retrospective rather than
proactive schemes are insufficient to address the potential damage
through inappropriate disclosure of PHI online. 208 Waiting to address
201. Another area where these regulations could have a positive impact
would be in patient-managed electronic medical records. As patients
i1:1cr~~singly begin to ~anage their own patient records electronically,
s1gmficant acces.s and disclosure issues will arise. See Terry, supra note
76 (outlining a framework to address issues between doctors and
patients regarding electronic medical records).
202. See supra Part I.
203. See supra Part III.A.
204. See supra part I.
205. See supra part II.A.

198. Id.

206. See supra Part II.B.l.

199. See supra Part III.A.
200. Preemption of disputes and the proposed resolution process would save
judicial resources as well.
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207. See supra Part II.B.2.
208. See supra Part II.B.2.
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Current regulations do not extend into this area. 205 Additionally,
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Similarly,
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frameworks rooted in a concept of physical space are a poor fit for
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HIT LOSERS: THE GOOD (FAITH)
FIGHT FOR NET-PROFITS PAYMENTS

the problem until information is inappropriately disclosed results in
little opportunity for a meaningful remedy.
Federal regulations would protect the value placed on control of
PHI by attaching protection to the information itself. It is more
realistic to place restrictions on what can be done with acquired
information than to attempt detailed regulation of this rapidly
evolving industry. 209 While users should also participate in the
protection of their personal information through use of the privacy
settings afforded, deceptive privacy advertisement and obtuse privacy
policies should not render this participation meaningless.
Preemptively establishing a set of federal regulations as a benchmark
for addressing these kinds of issues before they arise will help mitigate
the harms that are otherwise sure to follow. Federal regulations
requiring meaningful privacy disclosures and truthful advertising,
establishing guidelines for use of PHI, and providing causes of action
with precedential value would keep pace with reality of the evolution
of online social networking.
Federal regulations protecting PHI would fill the gap in the
current law, provide meaningful dispute resolution options and
remedies, and delineate concrete expectations for all participants.
The permanence of information posted online heightens the need for
this sort of protection. 210 It is all too likely that information posted
will become a permanent part of an individual's "digital" persona
without the mercy of short human memory. 211 Such a framework will
have broad applicability as more and more interactions move toward
online exchanges.

FROM BLOCKBUSTER HOLLYWOOD
PRODUCTIONS
Max Bialystock: You were saying that, under the right
circumstances, a producer could make more money with a flop
than he could with a hit.
Leo Bloom: Yes. It's quite possible.
Max Bialystock: You keep saying that, but you don't say how!
Leo Bloom: Well, it's simply a matter of creative accounting. 1
Gould: I think conservatively, you and me, we build ourselves
in to split, ten percent. (Pause.)
Fox: Of the net.
Gould: Char. Charlie: Permit me to tell you: two things I've
learned, twenty-five years in the entertainment industry.
Fox: What?
Gould: The two things which are always true.
Fox: One:
Gould: The first one is: there is no net.
Fox: Yeah ... ? (Pause.)
Gould: And I forgot the second one. 2 .

Neal Robin3
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Contracts for services on an entertainment project contain many
of the same provisions as those found in any commercial venture.
These contracts include provisions describing the nature of services to
be performed and the compensation to be provided in exchange for
those services during the course of the agreement. Sought-after
Hollywood actors, directors, and producers are able to secure
additional concessions from the studios that hope to gain their
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209. See supra Part IV.A.
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. Abril, supra note 19, at 75 (discussing how "the digital record has
increased 'the stakes of privacy today ... ").
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